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INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff-appellee, Ted Sommer d/b/a Sommer's Auto Wrecking 
("Sommer's Auto Wrecking") argues in its brief ("App. br.") that 
it has a valid seller's lien and that the issue whether or not 
that lien has priority over defendant-appellant Transmission 
Tech, Inc.'s ("Trans Tech") mechanic's lien "is essentially a 
moot question" because the truck was sold in partial satisfaction 
of the judgment of Sommer's Auto Wrecking and accordingly "the 
repairman's lien is forever gone". (See App. br. pp. 25 ftn 4, 
39-40) It has, of course, cited no legal authority for such an 
unjust result and Utah law nowise is so wooden. If Trans Tech 
prevails in this appeal, at a minimum the money proceeds from the 
formal public auction sale of the Truck in April, 1995 are 
rightfully recoverable, along with interest thereon. A more just 
result would provide for recovery of the amount for which 
Sommer's Auto Wrecking actually resold the Truck (i.e. damages 
for "conversion"), plus interest, since its successful bid at the 
auction was only a fraction of the Truck's real value. (See 
post, pp. 2, 21) 
Sommer's Auto Wrecking does not really dispute that the 
false notarization transaction took place during March, 19911. 
Moreover, it cites no legal authority from Utah or any other 
1
 It claims, however, that "...it was Wayne Sommer's name 
that was notarized (and known to the employees of Plaintiff). 
(R. 363-365)". (App. br. p. 19) This is, at best, patently 
misleading, as the documents stated that that illegible signature 
being notarized was that of the owner "Jack W. Sommer". 
QB1\2554A9.1 
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jurisdiction which has ever put the seal of judicial legitimacy 
upon a sale-lien transaction in which the seller's lien was 
grounded in and derived from a "false notarization", by holding 
that the lien is nonetheless valid, enforceable and entitled to 
"constructive" notice priority (i.e. not "void" or "voidable"). 
This should be the threshold and decisive issue in this appeal, 
and if the lien is indeed "void" or "voidable" as a matter of 
law, a new trial would not be necessary. (See post, sees. I.D., 
IV) Cf. e.g. Alta Industries, Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1288-
91 (Utah 1993) (trial court's legal errors held to be decisive 
and accordingly, case was not remanded for a new trial as to 
issues relating to fraud, conversion of property, and conspiracy; 
awarded compensatory damages based upon the amount of money 
received by the sale of the converted property plus interest); 
Ong. Intern. (U.S.A.) v 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 452-3 
(Utah 1993) (held releases were an "integral part" of the overall 
fraudulent "scheme" and accordingly "voidable"). 
Sommer's Auto Wrecking misstates the real issues to be 
resolved in this appeal in some of its argument headings (see 
App. br. pp. 18-9) In particular, the trial court's summary 
judgment adjudications concerning lien validity and priority did 
not hinge in any way upon Trans Tech's pre-trial motion to amend 
its pleadings (see post, sec. II) and did not hinge upon any 
common law principles such as unconscionability and equitable 
estoppel being pled or not pled as affirmative defenses, (see 
post, sees. Ill, IV, and V). Sommer's Auto Wrecking's Amended 
QB1\255449.1 
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Complaint requested the trial court to adjudge that it had a 
valid, enforceable and prior seller's lien in the Truck (see 
pars. 4, 5, 6, ll.d.). Moreover, Trans Tech's First Counterclaim 
based upon the Declaratory Judgment statute, Title 78, Chapter 
33, Utah Stats., requested declarations by the trial court as to 
all of the rights of Sommer's Auto Wrecking, including without 
limitation, relating to the issue whether it "presently has a 
legally valid lien on the Truck ...". Given these allegations, 
common law principles such as unconscionability and equitable 
estoppel had to be dealt with before the trial court could 
properly make the partial summary judgment adjudications which it 
made. Affirmative defenses did not have to be expressly pled in 
order to raise those issues. (See post, sees. Ill, IV) 
Sommer's Auto Wrecking meritlessly attempts to ignore the 
summary judgment adjudications which erroneously resolved almost 
all of the key factual issues in this case and to characterize 
this appeal insofar as it involves factual issues, as one from 
findings of fact made after a full blown trial. (See e.g. App. 
br. pp. 5, 34-6) But none of the eight cases cited by it, which 
did deal with such appeals, have anything whatsoever to do with 
this appeal which—with only a few limited exceptions—focuses 
upon erroneous partial summary judgment adjudications made a week 
before trial and erroneously adhered to during the trial. Those 
cases only relate to the few narrow disputed fact issues resolved 
by the trial court after the trial. (See also e.g. App. br. pp. 
13, 37-9) The motion to "reconsider" the summary judgment 
QB1\255449.1 
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adjudications at the trial was not one for a "new trial" (see 
App. br. pp. 34-6), but rather one directed to getting a chance 
to litigate for the first time the key fact issues posed in this 
case. 
The legal authorities cited and the detailed arguments made 
in Trans Tech's initial brief ("Tr.T.br.") will not be duplicated 
herein, but will be, at times, cross referenced. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PREJUDICIALLY ERRED IN GRANTING SOMMERfS 
AUTO WRECKING'S PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE IT HAD NOT 
COMPLIED WITH ANY OF THE KEY PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS OR 
ESTABLISHED THAT THERE WERE NO "MATERIAL" ISSUES OF FACT 
REMAINING TO BE RESOLVED AT THE TRIAL WHICH WAS TO COMMENCE 
ABOUT ONE WEEK LATER 
One fatal fallacy in the arguments of Sommer's Auto Wrecking 
relating to the fact that there were cross motions for summary 
judgment is pinpointed by its assertion that "(w)here the only 
controversy brought by the parties was the interpretation of a 
writing and both parties placed the question in the hands of the 
court by making mutual motions for summary judgment, the losing 
party was not entitled to a trial on the facts after the court 
made its decision", relying upon Mastic Tile. (See App. br. pp. 
3, 9) No such decisive written contract interpretation issue was 
posed in this case via the summary judgment motions or at trial. 
There is no per se rule of law that the summary judgment 
cross motions, ipso facto, absolved Sommer's Auto Wrecking from 
its burden-duty of submitting sufficient evidence vis a vis all 
"material" factual subjects encompassed by its motion and 
magically transformed those fact issues into issues of law. Trans 
QB1\255449.1 
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Tech's motion was premised upon its legal positions concerning 
"void" or "voidable" (see post, sees. I. D., IV) and in the 
alternative, it sought a trial as to all "fact" issues which were 
"material" under the legal principles adopted by the trial court. 
The case law relied upon by Sommer's Auto Wrecking to support its 
meritless notions, nowise do so. It had the burden of proving 
that no genuine "material" issue of fact existed vis a vis the 
validity, enforceability and priority of its claimed seller's 
lien. (See post, pp. 14-5) Robinson v. Intermountain Health 
Care, Inc., 740 P.2d 262, 263 (Utah App. 1987) (see App. br. p. 
26) so held, cautioning: 
Any doubts or uncertainties concerning issues 
of fact must be construed in favor of the party 
opposing summary judgment. (emphasis added) 
Sommer's Auto Wrecking failed to satisfy its demanding burden of 
proof. 
What might or might not have occurred orally off the record 
(e.g. said by Wayne Sommer) during the December 12, 1994 oral 
argument on the summary judgment motions, could not, and did not, 
cure those evidentiary deficiencies. (See post, I.B) As was held 
in Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281, 282-3 (Utah App. 1987) (see 
App. br. pp. 2, 31) where there also was no official record made 
of the summary judgment hearing and "concern" was expressed: 
... although prejudicial error can result from failure 
to make a complete record, we need not reach the issue of 
whether Rule 2(k) is unconstitutional because, in the 
instant case, the potential for prejudice is remedied by the 
intensive scrutiny given summary judgments on appeal. 
(emphasis added) 
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So viewed, the trial court's partial summary judgment 
adjudications in favor of Sommer's Auto Wrecking cannot be 
affirmed by this Court. Its attempts to explain the necessary 
undisputed evidentiary underpinnings therefor, fall woefully 
short. (See App. br. pp. 11-2) Indeed, almost all of the 
"evidence" relied upon consists of written "hearsay" statements 
under oath by Ted Sommer who had no personal knowledge as to what 
really happened or why during March, 1991. (See post, sec. I.A.) 
Sommer's Auto Wrecking's attempts to persuade this Court 
that it did not really have such a burden of proof, are also 
unavailing. The case law cited does not support that notion. 
For example, Anderson v. Liberty Lobbyr Inc., Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 
247-52, 256 (1986) (see App. br. p. 26) affirmed that "the movant 
has the burden of showing ...": 
The District Court granted summary judgment for 
the defendants, stating that there was no evidence 
from which reasonably minded jurors might draw an 
inference of conspiracy. We reversed, pointing 
out that the moving parties' submissions had not 
foreclosed the possibility of the existence of 
certain facts from which "it would be open to a 
jury ... to infer from the circumstances" that 
there had been a meeting of minds. 
(emphasis added) 
Like "conspiracy" reasoning is controlling here. (See post, 
sees. I.D., V) 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, Administratrix of Estate of 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321-9, 330-9 (1987) (see App. br. pp. 25-
6) only dealt in a 5-4 decision with a situation not present here 
involving "...an element essential to that party's case and on 
QB1\255AA9.1 
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which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial". (See 
post, sec. I.B.) 
In Schurtz v. BMW of North America, Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 
1109, 1111-2 (Utah 1991) (see App. br. p. 2) the trial court's 
granting of "partial summary judgment was reversed." It was held 
"... at the outset that a challenge to a summary judgment 
presents for review only conclusions of law because, by 
definition, cases decided on summary judgment do not involve 
factual issues" and "(w)e therefore accord no deference to a 
trial court's legal conclusions given to support the grant of 
summary judgment, but review them for correctness." See also 
e.g., Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Under., 398 
P.2d 685, 688 (Utah 1965) (see App. p. 3) (trial court's summary 
judgment in a fraud-duress setting was reversed, it being 
explained that "... any doubts which exist should be resolved in 
favor of affording him the privilege of a trial."); Watkiss & 
Campbell v. FOA & Son, 808 P.2d 1061, 1063-6, 1069 (Utah 1991) 
(see App. br. pp. 3, 34) (motion to "reconsider" a summary 
judgment was given legal effect on appeal and the summary 
judgment was reversed). 
In L&A Drvwall, Inc. v. Withmore Const. Co. Inc., 608 P.2d 
626, 628-30 (App. p. 2) (Utah 1980) not only was the trial 
court's granting of summary judgment reversed (it is "appropriate 
only where there exist no genuine issue of fact relevant to the 
disposition of the claim underlying the motion."), but also 
because "(i)t is our view that, as a matter of law, plaintiff is 
QB1\255A49.1 
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precluded from prevailing in this matter"f the case was not 
remanded "for a trial on the merits." (608 P.2d at 63) This 
Court is in a position to do likewise, if it embraces Trans 
Tech's legal principles vis a vis "void" or "voidable". (See 
post, sec. IV) 
Sommer's Auto Wrecking's total non-compliance with Rule 4 -
501, U.R.J.A., in processing its summary judgment motion—which 
it attempts to make light of and pass over (App. br. p. 30)—was 
in itself fatal to that motion. (See Tr.T.br. pp. 26-7) Cf also 
e.g. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 796-7 (Utah 
1991) (dealt with 10 days notice of hearing requirement of 
U.R.C.P. 56(c) for summary judgment motions and pointed out that 
"such a violation will void the grant unless the violation 
amounts to harmless error"). 
A* Summary Statement of Disputed and Undisputed "Material" 
Facts as of the December 12, 1994 Oral Argument 
Incredibly, most of the "(u)ndisputed facts in the record" 
which are relied upon by Sommer's Auto Wrecking have as their 
genesis the "hearsay" affidavit of Ted Sommer which is 
"R. 625-7". (See App. br. pp. 11-2). The verification of the 
allegations in the Amended Complaint and the various documents by 
Ted Sommer, as well as his affidavit, had no legal effect and 
cannot support summary judgment adjudications. (Tr. T. br. pp. 
25-6) See also e.g. Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 
482, 485, 487-8, 491 (Utah App. 1990) 
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B. Sommer Eq.'s Motion For Partial Summary Judgment was, 
at Best from its Point of View, Premature Because Key 
"Material" Evidentiary Facts had not been Proven by It 
to be Undisputed 
Sommer's Auto Wrecking adverts to Wayne Sommer's personal 
appearance at the summary judgment hearing on December 12, 1994 
and claims that he orally acknowledged off the formal record that 
it was his personal signature on the documents which stated that 
the owner was his father "Jack W. Sommer" which had been 
notarized as that of his father. (App. br. p. 19). However, this 
is not admissible evidence in the summary judgment record and 
cannot cure the holes in the formal record. (See ante, pp. 5-6) 
Nor does this "false notarization" fact render the lien valid or 
enforceable, but rather "void" or "voidable." (See post, 
sec. I.D., IV) 
C. Sommer Eg. did not Prove that Either Wayne Sommer or 
Jack W. Sommer Actually gave it a Valid Written 
Seller's Lien on the Truck Which was Then Enforceable 
The mere fact that Sommer's Auto Wrecking reserved a 
security interest in the "falsely notarized" Certificate of Title 
application (App. br. p.27), does not answer the issue whether or 
not there was an underlying valid and enforceable seller's lien 
entitled in equity to priority. (See post, III) None of the 
cases cited by Sommer's Auto Wrecking have anything to do with 
this issue. For example, West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 
818 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah App. 1991) (see App. br. p. 5) simply 
held that the "interpretation of a contract begins with a 
question of law, reviewed for correctness, i.e., "Is the contract 
QB1\2554A9.1 
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unambiguous?" But the written purchase contract Issue in this 
case is not one of interpretation, but rather involves the 
validity, enforceability, and priority of its seller's lien. 
This also is the sole import of Wade v. Stanql, 869 P.2d 9, 11-3 
(Utah App, 1994) (see App. br, p.5) which also only dealt with an 
interpretation issue. The key fact is that the documentation in 
the summary judgment record simply did not contain any terms 
giving the seller a lien on the Truck because the back side of 
the purchase order was not in that record. Moreover, extrinsic 
evidence is, of course, always admissible with respect to issues 
going to the enforceability (e.g. unconscionability, estoppel) of 
the written contract. (See post, sec. Ill) 
But the real issue is how partial summary judgment 
adjudications could have been made as to the validity, 
enforceability, and priority of its claimed seller's lien without 
the trial court covering in its adjudication a number of most 
"material" factual subjects relating to that transaction (i.e. 
whether the blanks in the purchase order were all filled in when 
it was signed? who signed? when? why? was the signer given a 
copy? what document gave the seller a lien?) Sommer's Auto 
Wrecking tries in vain to defend these critical gaps in the 
summary judgment evidentiary record via trial findings of fact 
made after a very truncated "trial" during which the trial court 
adhered to its summary judgment adjudications and cut off most 
evidentiary inquiries encompassed thereby. 
QB1\2554A9.1 
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D. Assuming, Arguendo, that a Valid Lien was Initially 
Created by the "Buyer" when the Truck was Purchased by 
Jack W. Sommer and/or Wayne Sommer, there were 
"Material" fact Issues as to whether it would be at 
that Juncture Equitably Unenforceable (e.g. Because of 
the Knowing Participation of One or More of Sommer 
Eq.'s Representatives in the Fraudulent Creation of a 
Falsely Notarized Certificate of Title Stating that 
"Jack W. Sommer" is the Legal Owner of the Truck, when 
this was not the Truth) 
Sommer's Auto Wrecking fallaciously lumps together various 
issues related to "fraud" occurring at the summary judgment 
juncture and at trial. (App. br. pp. 25-6) It emphasizes that 
the trial court found after the trial that "it was Defendant 
Wayne Sommer who requested title to be in his father's name" (see 
App. br. pp. 37-9), arguing that for some inexplicable reason, 
this is "not material to the summary judgment." But even if so 
requested by Wayne, there still could have been a wrongful 
conspiracy to "hinder" or "delay" creditors involving Wayne, Dale 
11 and W. Anderson, which would have rendered that March, 1991 
transaction "void" or "voidable". (See App. br. p. ii, 4, 14-5) 
Where a fraudulent (e.g. void, voidable) sale-lien 
transaction is alleged involving a son and his father, the burden 
is on the alleged offenders (i.e. Dale and Wayne Sommer) to prove 
the "good faith" and "honest purpose" of that transaction by 
"clear and satisfactory evidence" since they are necessarily the 
only persons who really know what happened and why. Cf. e.g. 
Paxton v. Paxton, 15 P.2d 1051, 1053, 1056-7 (Utah 1932). The 
Supreme Court held: 
It is quite generally held that a transfer or 
mortgage of property between near relatives which 
QB1\255449.1 
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is calculated to prevent a creditor from realizing 
on his claim against one of such relatives is 
subject to rigid scrutiny, 27 C. J. 495, and cases 
there cited. (15 P.2d at 1056; emphasis added) 
It was held that that heavy burden of proof has not been met 
during that trial because of various "badges of fraud." For 
example, it was pointed out that the "notary" was present in 
court, but "not called to testify." (15 P.2d at 105-67). 
These "intent to defraud, hinder or delay creditors" cases 
are useful analogies vis a vis the fraudulent intent issues posed 
in this case, since there also are several such "badges of fraud" 
in this summary judgment record. See also e.g. Zuniga v. Evans,, 
48 P.2d 513, 515-521 (Utah 1935) (held after trial that the 
transaction was fraudulent as to creditors because there was no 
fair consideration and there was disbelief of witnesses); Lund v. 
Howell, 67 P.2d 215, 217-9 (Utah 1937); Bocca Ler v. Bee, 126 
P.2d 1063, 1067-8 (Utah 1942); Ned J. Bowman Co. v. White, 369 
P.2d 962, 963 (Utah 1962) Sommer's Auto Wrecking's attempt to 
pass off this transaction as "a mere accommodation to the 
customer (App. br. p.28) certainly does not fly as a matter of 
law as the only "reasonable inference". 
Territorial Sav. Loan Assyn. v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452, 454-863 
(Utah App. 1989) is closely in point. There also were cross 
motions for summary judgment and on appeal several of the trial 
court's summary judgment adjudications were reversed because 
there were genuine "material" issues of fact vis a vis various 
subjects (e.g. bona fide debts, good faith, fair equivalent, 
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fraudulent intent) relating to whether the conveyance of real 
estate was "void" vis a vis creditors: 
Since this case was disposed of on a motion 
for summary judgment, we review the facts and 
inferences reasonably drawn therefrom in the light 
most favorable to TSL.... 
*** 
In granting summary judgment, a trial court 
must not weigh or resolve disputed evidence.... 
Furthermore, "[c]ross-motions for summary judgment 
do not ipso facto dissipate factual issues, even 
though both parties contend for the purposes of 
their motions that they are entitled to prevail 
because there are no material issues of fact." 
(781 P.2d at 454, 456; emphasis added) 
The appellate court focused upon whether the debtor had used the 
conveyance for the purpose of placing his "property" beyond the 
reach of their creditors' just claims, while simultaneously 
retaining and enjoying virtually all the advantages of 
ownership". (781 P.2d at 456-7) That shoe certainly fits via 
reasonable inference the March, 1991 transaction set up by Wayne 
Sommer, Dale al and the deceased notary public, W. Anderson. 
(See also post, sec. IV.) 
In Territorial there was extensive discussion vis a vis such 
inferential "badges of fraud": 
They are not usually conclusive proof; they are 
open to explanation. They may be almost 
conclusive, or they may furnish merely a 
reasonable inference of fraud, according to the 
weight to which they may be entitled from their 
intrinsic character and the special circumstances 
attending the case. Often a single one of them 
may establish and stamp a transaction as 
fraudulent ... 
The generally recognized badges of fraud are 
the lack of consideration for the conveyance, the 
transfer of the debtor's entire estate, the 
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relationship between transferor and the 
transferee, the pendency or threat of litigation, 
secrecy or hurried transaction, insolvency or 
indebtedness of the transferor, departure from the 
usual method of business, the retention by the 
debtor of possession of the property, and the 
reservation of benefit to the transferor. 
However, "[t]he facts which are recognized indicia of fraud 
are numerous, and no court could pretend to anticipate or 
catalog them all." Koch, 716 P.2d at 184 (quoting 37 
Am.Jur.2d Fraudulent Conveyances §10 (1968)) 
(781 P.2d at 462-3 emphasis added). 
Such "reasonable inferences" in the summary judgment record 
render the trial court's adjudications to the contrary made, as a 
matter of law, prejudicial error. 
It is not decisive whether or not Wayne Sommer had also done 
so in the past or whether or not it was a general practice for 
other buyers to also put vehicles in other persons' names. 
(App.br. pp. 6, 11, 14-5) The key was the "false notarization" 
of "Jack W. Sommer's" signature. Trade usage and course of 
dealing are "admissible evidence" under § 70A-1-205, U.C.A., only 
vis a vis the interpretation of a written agreement's ambiguous 
terms. No such interpretation issue is posed in this case. 
II- UNDER UTAH LAW, TRANS TECH'S PROPOSED COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST 
SOMMER'S AUTO WRECKING FOR THE DAMAGES IT HAD SUSTAINED AS A 
RESULT OF THE MARCH, 1991 FRAUDULENT-"FALSE NOTARIZATION" 
SALE TRANSACTION IS MANDATORY AND, ACCORDINGLY, SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN ALLOWED BY THE TRIAL COURT TO BE ASSERTED IN THIS 
ACTION 
None of the three cases cited by Sommer's Auto Wrecking are 
even remotely in point and nowise justify the trial court's 
denial. For example, in Kleinert v. Kimball Elevators, 854 P.2d 
1025, 1027-8 (Utah App. 1993) (see App. br. pp. 4, 36, 37) the 
QB1\255AA9.1 
8/17/95-3 1 4 
trial court's grant of summary judgment as to the negligence 
claim was reversed ("•.• we view the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences therein in the light most favorable to the appellant") 
and it explained: 
Utah Courts have focused on three factors when 
deciding whether to grant a motion to amend: (1) 
the timeliness of the motion; (2) the 
justification given by the movant for the delay; 
and (3) the resulting prejudice to the responding 
party• (854 P.2d at 1028; emphasis added) 
None of these three factors justified the denial of Trans Tech's 
motion to amend to assert its mandatory counterclaim which would 
be legally lost unless asserted in this action. 
Contrary to Sommer's Auto Wrecking's contentions, (see App. 
br. pp. ii; 4, 15, 17, 18), it is not until Dale Mickelson 
eventually-finally answered shortly before trial some of Trans 
Tech's written interrogatories to Sommer's Auto Wrecking that 
there was any formal discovery responses from anyone with 
personal knowledge as to what really had happened during that 
March, 1991 transaction. Moreover, Wayne Sommer continued to 
refuse to obey the trial court's Order that he answer the written 
interrogatories to the time of trial. 
Most importantly, there would have been no "resulting 
prejudice" to Sommer's Auto Wrecking. No new parties would have 
been added as in Kelly (App.br.p.4). Sommer's Auto Wrecking 
argues that "... additional discovery would not have been 
feasible within the time remaining for trial." But there was no 
need for any discovery by it and no need to delay the trial, for 
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it always had access to Dale Mickelson's memory. (See App. pp. 
29, 36-7) Sommer's Auto Wrecking also argues that such 
amendments would have been "legally insufficient or futile" 
because sufficient detailed facts had not been pled in the 
amendment to set forth a claim sounding in fraud. But even 
assuming arguendo, such as deficiency existed, it could have been 
easily rectified via amendments by Trans Tech if a motion to 
dismiss that fraud contention on that basis had been interposed. 
Kasco Services Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86, 89, 92-3 (Utah 
1992) (see App. br. p. 2) held that the refusal to allow the 
amendment was an abuse of discretion: 
Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
states in part that leave to amend "shall be 
freely given when justice so requires." We have 
held, "A primary consideration that a trial judge 
must take into account in determining whether 
leave should be granted is whether the opposing 
side would be put to unavoidable prejudice by 
having an issue adjudicated for which he had not 
had time to prepare." 
831 P.2d at 92; emphasis added. 
This same reasoning establishes that the trial court in this case 
also abused its discretion, as there was no evidence of such 
"unavoidable prejudice" to Sommer's Auto Wrecking. 
III. THERE IS, AS A MATTER OF LAW, NO VALID SIGNED AGREEMENT 
IN THE RECORD BEFORE THIS COURT GIVING SOMMER'S AUTO 
WRECKING A SELLER'S LIEN ON THE TRUCK AND ACCORDINGLY 
NO "CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE" THEREOF WAS GIVEN TO TRANS 
TECH 
This issue involves not only the aforesaid "void" vs. 
"voidable" common law principles relating to the false 
notarization of "Jack W. Sommer's" illegible signature, but also 
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the additional issues whether there is a valid and enforceable 
underlying written contract entitled to legal priority. By the 
trial, the missing back side of the purchase contract which 
purported to give Sommer's Auto Wrecking a seller's lien, was 
finally in evidence. But Resource Management Co. v. Weston 
Paneh, 706 P.2d 1028, 1040-9 (Utah 1985) (App. br. p. 33) set 
forth the basic common law principles of procedural and 
substantive "unconscionability" which nonetheless rendered that 
purported seller's lien invalid and unenforceable. 
"The determination of unconscionability is a question of 
law" and accordingly, "the court is therefore free to review the 
record and make its own conclusions as to the determination". 
Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006, 1016 (Utah 1991). 
in Resource Management, the court 
distinguished "substantive" and "procedural" 
unconscionability. Procedural unconscionability 
focuses on the manner in which the contract was 
negotiated and the circumstances of the parties, 
706 P.2d at 1041, can be characterized as the 
"absence of meaningful choice" and a "gross 
inequality of bargaining power." ... Substantive 
unconscionability examines the relative fairness 
of the obligations assumed; it requires terms "so 
one-sided as to oppress or unfairly surprise an 
innocent party," ... or "an overall imbalance in 
the obligations and rights imposed by the 
bargain•" 
(818 P.2d at 1017; emphasis added) 
The underlying written contract purporting to give Soranver's Auto 
Wrecking the seller's lien in the Truck as a matter of law cannot 
pass muster either a "procedurally" or "substantively" (See also 
ante, sec. I.e.) 
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Such validity and enforceability issues posed vis a vis the 
genesis of the claimed seller's lien are not, as Sommer's Auto 
Wrecking meritlessly argues, ones involving statute of fraud and 
equitable estoppel affirmative defenses. (App. br. pp. 29-33) 
There is no question of any oral agreement giving it a seller's 
lien. These issues were raised by Trans Tech's first 
counterclaim seeking declarations under the Utah Declaratory 
Judgment Act vis a vis all of Plaintiff-Appellee's legal rights 
in the Truck and indeed, by the Amended Complaint itself. (See 
ante, pp. 2-3; Tr.T.br. pp. 32-5, 37-40, 49) These issues all 
involve essential elements in Sommer's Auto Wrecking's claim that 
it had a valid and enforceable seller's lien having "constructive 
notice" priority. 
IV. ALL THE SALES DOCUMENTATION CREATED IN THE MARCH, 1991 
"FALSE NOTARIZATION"-FRAUDULENT SALES TRANSACTION INVOLVING 
THE TRUCK WERE "VOID" AB INITIO OR AT LEAST "VOIDABLE" 
Sommer's Auto Wrecking's notions are incompatible with Meyer 
v. General American Corp., 569 P.2d 1094, 1095 (Utah, 1987)2 
where it was held that the conveyance of a caterpillar tractor 
was "void" because it was a "fraudulent sale" vis a vis creditors 
in that the vendee did not take possession, there was a "lack of 
good faith", and there was constructive notice of fraudulent 
intent vis a vis creditors because of circumstances ... that 
2
 Appellee's counsel adverts to this case (App. br. p. 27, 
ftn. 5), but never inquired of appellant's counsel as to what its 
full citation was, even though there obviously had been a 
typographical omission in appellant's initial brief. 
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should put a reasonable person on guard so as to require further 
inquiry on his part" that the "transaction may be tainted and 
that other persons are likely to be involved": 
Other indicia of fraud—failure of Terra to 
deliver the caterpillar to McCurtain, failure of 
McCurtain to take steps to protect his interest, 
and the attempt made by the parties to keep the 
transactions "secret" from Meyer ... are enough to 
justify the court's findings. 
Under the evidence as presented, the trial court 
committed no error in holding that the conveyance 
from GAC to Terra and, subsequently, to McCurtain, 
was void. (569 P.2d at 1097; emphasis added) 
In this case there are also similar "indicia of fraud" and the 
basic March, 1991 sale-lien transaction also should be adjudged 
"void". (See also ante, sec. I.) 
In Meyer also the party involved in that tainted transaction 
argued that its lien was valid and had priority under the Utah 
Uniform Commercial Code. But the Supreme Court held to the 
contrary, ruling that another statute, the Utah Fraudulent 
Conveyance Act, was controlling "as a protection against ... [an] 
unjust result against an innocent party because of a strict 
application of the priorities "established in the statute." (569 
P.2d at 1097-8) It was reasoned that "(w)hen a conveyance is 
found void under the Utah Fraudulent Conveyance Act, it is 
treated as if the transaction never took place at all; hence, it 
is not necessary to reach the question of priorities under 
Article 9 of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code since the security 
agreement cannot be held to exist if the conveyance from which 
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the security interest arose is void from its inception." (569 
P.2d at 1098). 
Like reasoning is controlling vis a vis Sommer's Auto 
Wrecking's claimed seller's lien in the Truck which should be 
held by this Court to have never existed legally. See also e.g. 
Molitor v. Molitor, 440 A.2d 215, 218-9 (Conn. 1981) (affirmed 
trial court's adjudication that conveyance was "void" under 
common law fraudulent conveyance-creditors principles). Sommer's 
Auto Wrecking argues that the "statutes are clear on the" 
priority, validity and enforceability issues involving the 
seller's lien and that the seller's lien "is valid where, as 
here, said lien is disclosed in the title." (App. br. pp. 15-6, 
18-9,) But it can cite no such statute or even any supporting 
case law. 
Its sole attempt to justify the "false notarization" 
transaction, ala Meyer, involves reliance upon the inapposite 
U.C.A. § 70A-9-112 (See App. br. pp. 21-3) However, that section 
only deals with the rights and duties of the secured party vis a 
vis collateral that is "owned" by a party who is not the "debtor" 
Clearfield State Bank v. Contos. 562 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1977). 
It nowise legally justifies a "false notarization" of an 
illegible signature so as to result in the issuance of a 
Certificate of Title falsely stating that the "owner" is "Jack W. 
Sommer". Official Comment to U.C.C. § 9-112. 
§ 70A-9-112 has nothing to do with Wayne Sommer's 
unauthorized placing of the Truck in his father's name via a 
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"false notarization" of his name on the application for the 
Certificate of Title, Id. Such issues are left for the 
judiciary to resolve via common law principles and other 
statutes. Id. Cf. e.g., Towe Farms. Inc. v. Cent. Iowa Prod. 
Credit, 528 F.Supp. 500, 505-7 (S.D. Iowa 1981) (cattle 
repossessed and sold; summary judgment denied; held section "does 
not apply where, as in this case, the debtor pledges another's 
property without authority to do so"; issue involved alleged 
"conversion" of the cattle); Peoples Nat. Bk. of N. J. v. Fowler, 
372 A.2d 1096, 1101-4) (N.J. 1977). 
U.C.A. § 70A-9-112 does not deal with the issue whether a 
"false notarization" in the application for a vehicle Certificate 
of Title results in the underlying sale-lien transaction being 
"void" or "voidable"—particularly as to creditors (e.g. 
mechanic's lien claimants) who do not have actual personal 
knowledge as to what really happened. The Official U.C.C. 
Comment explains: 
The section does not purport to be an 
exhaustive treatment of the subject. It isolates 
certain problems which may be expected to arise 
and states rules as to them. Others will no doubt 
arisez their solution is left to the courts. 
(emphasis added) 
The drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code also noted in the 
official comment 4(e) to § 70A-9-103, U.C.A. that the "state will 
have every reason, nevertheless, to make its certificate of title 
reliable to the type of person who most needs to rely on it." 
The Certificate of Title is what third parties (e.g. creditors) 
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record, only one inference is possible ["as a matter of law"]— 
namely, that the debtors had the intent to hinder, delay or 
defraud creditors". Such a ruling in this appeal would obviate 
the necessity of a new trial and Soramer's Auto Wrecking attempts 
to explain their real motivation are most suspect, if not 
unbelievable. 
The reference in U.C.A. § 38-2-3, to mechanics lien being 
"subject and subordinate to the rights and interests of any 
secured parties..." (App. br. p. 24-5), when properly 
interpreted, only refers to valid and enforceable lien "rights 
and interests" equitably entitled to such property—not to those 
which are "void" or "voidable". But the "public policy" choice 
for this Court in fashioning the controlling common law 
principles is clear. Unless common law teeth are put into the 
statutory requirements relating to vehicle Certificates of Title, 
unprincipled sellers such as Sommer's Auto Wrecking will 
doubtlessly continue to feel free to use "false notarization" 
sales whenever and for whomever they please—regardless of the 
injurious consequences to other. 
It is certainly true that the "false notarization" of "Jack 
W. Sommer"'s signature did not cause or induce Trans Tech to do 
the repairs and it did not actually rely on the Certificate of 
Title in doing so. (App. br. pp. 16, 20-1, 24, 25) But once the 
repairs had been made by it without knowledge as to had really 
occurred in March, 1991 and Trans Tech began to try to sort out 
what its legal rights were vis a vis being paid for its repairs 
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V, THERE ALSO 'WAS NOT THE REQUISITE "PERFECTION" OF THE CLAIMED 
SELLER'S LIEN AND ACCORDINGLY NO "CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE 
THEREOF WAS GIVEN TO TRANS TECH 
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Interestingly, Sommer's Auto Wrecking never even attempts to 
explain how the March, 1991 "false notarization" sale-lien 
transaction could have legally "perfected" its seller's lien so 
as to give it "constructive notice" lien priority over the 
mechanic's lien of Trans Tech, an innocent party having no actual 
knowledge thereof. (See Tr.T.br. pp. 23-4, 31-2, 44-50) 
CONCLUSION 
Depending upon the common law legal principles embraced by 
this Court, this case should be either remanded for a new trial 
on all "material" facts issues or for entry of a judgment in 
favor of Trans Tech as a matter of law. 
Respectfully submitted this \J_ day of August, 1995. 
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